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DOCUMENT 
Qonald C Barker K F U 2870 South State Street 
Mitchell U Barker 50 Barker Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
David C Cundiek -^A3£) g^t^^hmO^cc— Telephone (801) 486-9638 
DOCKET NO. ?«V /*^V TTTanuary, 1990 
H i ED Utah Court of Appeals 
Attention: Clerk 
230 South 500 East #400 JAM I 9 l>J3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
'
T
 APPEALS 
Re: Reynolds v. Reynolds, 
Docket No. 880420-CA 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
To the Clerk of the Court of Appeals: 
Introduction. Pursuant to Rule 24(j), R. Utah Ct. App., 
this letter is to notify the Court of the case of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). This case 
was decided months after the briefing in this appeal was 
completed. 
Relevance. Appellant believes this case constitutes 
"pertinent and significant" authority which came to apppellant's 
attention after the the reply brief was filed. R. Utah Ct. App. 
24 (j) • Five copies of this letter are enclosed with this 
original. 
Summary of Holding. Webster is not squarely on point, as 
it does not involve the rights of fathers in relation to 
abortion. It is, however, a watershed case, signaling a 
narrowing of abortion rights and an expansion of the states1 
ability to regulate. 
While Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 
147 (1973) was not expressly overturned, state regulation was 
permitted beyond the bounds Roe and its progeny previously 
allowed. This included prohibition of abortion in public 
facilities or performance of abortion by public employees, and a 
presumption of viability at 20 weeks. The upheld statute 
requires that physicians perform tests to overcome the 
presumption. 
The majority also refused to overturn the preamble, which 
stated that life begins at conception, that unborn children have 
protectable interests in life, and that natural parents have 
protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of 
their unborn children. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3049, n. 4. The 
Supreme Court did not discuss the parental rights provision. 
The preamble was upheld because Roe implies no limitation 
on states' authority to make value judgments favoring birth over 
abortion. Webster found the preamble was more a policy 
statement than an abortion regulation, 109 S.Ct. at 3050. 
The prohibition of public facilities and employees 
becoming involved in abortions was upheld, because it places no 
government obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to 
terminate her pregnancy. 109 S.Ct at 3052. 
Roe narrowed by plurality. To uphold the 20 week 
viability presumption and viability testing requirements, a 
Webster plurality found it necessary to reject the "rigid 
trimester analysis" of Roe. 109 S.Ct at 3056. Roe's system was 
found to be "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." 
Id. In this part of the holding, Justice O'Connor concurred but 
did not join. 
The plurality of Rehnquist, White and Kennedy found a. 
compelling state interest in potential life not only after 
viability, but throughout the pregnancy. Id. at 3057. See also 
p. 3069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) "To the extent indicated in 
our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding 
cases." Id. at 3058. 
Justice Blackmun's dissent points out that the 
plurality's standard would balance the state's newly labeled 
compelling interest in potential human life against the "liberty 
interest" of the pregnant woman in procuring an abortion. Id. 
at 3077, n. 11. 
O'Connors concurrence. Justice O'Connor differed with 
the majority only on the rationale which should be used to 
uphold the viability testing requirements. Id. at 3060. She 
wished to reserve any express limitation on Roe to a future day. 
Id. at 3061. She did observe that she continues to find Roe's 
trimester system problematic. Id. at 3063. She state that she 
would uphold the testing, since it does not provide an "undue 
burden" on the woman's abortion decision. Id. 
Scalia's concurrence. Justice Scalia would have gone 
further than the other four justices constituting the majority. 
He would have re-examined and overturned Roe. Id. at 3066-67. 
Effect on this case. Rule 24 requires reference be made 
in this letter to the portions of appellant's brief affected by 
the new authority. R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j). Since it appears 
that states now have a compelling interest in fetal life from 
conception, and the trimester system was abandoned, appellant 
believes all the abortion cases relied upon by respondent become 
dead letters—overruled sub sneniiu, Thi • .VJJ; affect 
appellant's opening and reply briefs throughout. 
Unlike respondent, Appellant s;-. o J^w-- ::r - ito 
action is involved. But Webster would favor appellant ew-r if 
the Court finds judicial action is state action. While it is 
difficult tc 3raw a clear line around the Webster holding, It 
appears the lowest comroon denominator among the majority is that 
there is now an "absolute obstacle", "rational basis" or "undue 
burden" test for state abortion regulation. This test is easily 
met, and balancing fathers rights and the state's interes* in 
fetal development would not appear *• = * iolato it. 
Some sections of appellant's briefs will be particularly 
affected, including the following sections, beginning n the 
pages indicated: 
Brief III, p. 15 {abortion right not absolute] 
Brief VII, p. 23 {Utah public policy restricts abort ;.;v 
Brief IX, p. 25 (Mo state action is involved} 
Brief VIII, p. 30 {Roe v. Wade is eroding} 
Reply III, p. 4 {Danforth does not control this rr??^ } 
Reply V, p. 0 t No state action is involved} 
Reply X, p. .":'[ {Roe v. Wade ^h^-il^ ^° narrowed} 
Thank, you for your attention, and for bringing this case 
tc the attention of the Court* 11: ther-1 ^re questions, please 
contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Mitchell ^ » B?,rk~r 
Copy: David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
Michael S. Evans, Esq. 
Julie A. Bryan, Esq. 
525 East 100 South, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
